Turing Machine s and Universes
In 1936 an American ( Alonzo Church ) and a Briton (Alan M. Turing) published independently (as is often the coincidence in science) the basics of a new branch in Mathematics (and logic): computability ">computability or recursive functions (later to be developed into Automata Theory).
The authors confined themselves to dealing with computations which involved ?effective? or ?mechanical? methods for finding results (which could also be expressed as solutions (values) to formulae ). These methods were so called because they could, in principle, be performed by simple machines (or human-computers or human-calculators, to use Turing?s unfortunate phrases). The emphasis was on finiteness : a finite number of instructions, a finite number of symbols in each instruction, a finite number of steps to the result. This is why these methods were usable by humans without the aid of an apparatus (with the exception of pencil and paper as memory aids). Moreover: no insight or ingenuity were allowed to ?interfere? or to be part of the solution seeking process.
What Church and Turing did was to construct a set of all the functions whose values could be obtained by applying effective or mechanical calculation methods. Turing went further down Church?s road and designed the ?Turing Machine? ? a machine which can calculate the values of all the functions whose values can be found using effective or mechanical method s. Thus, the program running the TM (=Turing Machine in the rest of this text) was really an effective or mechanical method. For the initiated readers: Church solved the decision-problem for propositional calculus and Turing proved that there is no solution to the decision problem relating to the predicate calculus . Put more simply, it is possible to ?prove? the truth value (or the theorem status) of an expression in the propositional calculus ? but not in the predicate calculus. Later it was shown that many functions (even in number theory itself) were not recursive, meaning that they could not be solved by a Turing Machine.
No one succeeded to prove that a function must be recursive in order to be effectively calculable. This is (as Post noted) a ?working hypothesis? supported by overwhelming evidence. We don?t know of any effectively calculable function which is not recursive, by designing new TMs from existing ones we can obtain new effectively calculable functions from existing ones and TM computability stars in every attempt to understand effective calculability (or these attempts are reducible or equivalent to TM computable function s).
The Turing Machine itself, though abstract, has many ?real world? features. It is a blueprint for a computing device with one ?ideal? exception: its unbounded memory (the tape is infinite). Despite its hardware appearance (a read/write head which scans a two-dimensional tape inscribed with ones and zeroes, etc.) ? it is really a software application, in today?s terminology. It carries out instructions, reads and writes, counts and so on. It is an automaton designed to implement an effective or mechanical method of solving functions (determining the truth value of propositions). If the transition from input to output is deterministic we have a classical automaton ? if it is determined by a table of probabilities ? we have a probabilistic automaton.
With time and hype, the limitations of TMs were forgotten. No one can say that the Mind is a TM because no one can prove that it is engaged in solving only recursive functions. We can say that TMs can do whatever digital computers are doing ? but not that digital computers are TMs by definition. Maybe they are ? maybe they are not. We do not know enough about them and about their future.
Moreover, the demand that recursive functions be computable by an UNAIDED human seems to restrict possible equivalents. Inasmuch as computers emulate human computation (Turing did believe so when he helped construct the ACE, at the time the fastest computer in the world) ? they are TMs. Functions whose values are calculated by AIDED humans with the contribution of a computer are still recursive. It is when humans are aided by other kinds of instruments that we have a problem. If we use measuring devices to determine the values of a function it does not seem to conform to the definition of a recursive function. So, we can generalize and say that functions whose values are calculated by an AIDED human could be recursive, depending on the apparatus used and on the lack of